.: The IOC code of ethics

Many of the world’s most powerful corporate, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations are not answerable to the people they affect according to ‘The Global Accountability Report’ (GAR), released [in Dec 2008] by one of the world’s leading global governance think tanks, the One World Trust.

At a time when serious global challenges such as the credit crunch are devastating lives, businesses and economies across the globe, all thirty organisations in the report failed to score over 80% when assessed against the think tanks accountability indicators – a level the One World Trust says indicates accountability reforms beyond the basic minimum.

The International Olympics Committee (IOC) received the lowest overall score in the report with 32%, closely followed by The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (33%), which promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and NATO (36%), which accounts for over 70% of the world's defence spending.

Source: 2008 GAR, Accountability Profile, One World Trust

The Swiss cooptation system: advantages and risks - (ICRC, IOC)
Both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the IOC are governed via the Swiss cooptation system. This system involves a self selecting, self perpetuating membership, in the case of the ICRC of to 15 to 25 individuals and in the case of the IOC of up to 115 individuals.
Cooptation attempts to exclude any kind of external influence, and prevent governments from influencing decisions. In theory, this exclusivity preserves the authenticity of its neutrality and independence. For example, in the case of the IOC, whose work in selecting host cities for the Olympic Games is highly political, the cooptation system reduces the potential for political influence that having country representatives on the IOC might bring.
p40 GAR 2008

The cooptation structure is also non-representative and insular by design; gaining access to decision making structures is therefore difficult for external stakeholders and may, in the case of the IOC, account for some of the recent history of corruption. (The host city selection process for the 2002 Winter Olympic games in Salt Lake City for example, resulted in the expulsion of ten members of the IOC)
p41 GAR 2008

For some of us, the freeloading in bidding cities, college scholarships, ticket rackets, shakedowns for gifts and hospitality for members' extended families were only a symptom of the problem. The physical corruption was the offspring of their fundamental moral corruption, their refusal to tolerate democratic elections to their ranks or make themselves accountable to sport.

p325, The Great Olympic Swindle, Andrew Jennings and Clare Sambrook, Simon & Schuster, 2000

....the IOC's impact in selecting host cities is so wide spread and long term that it is difficult to separate from the long term urban development of potential and actual host cities. While the methodological challenges associated with measuring impact provide an explanation for why [this] organisation [has] weak evaluation capabilities, they are not an excuse.
p55 GAR 2008

Transparency
No senior manager is identified as having responsibility for oversight of IOC transparency practices or compliance with IOC commitments on transparency, nor is any training or guidance on the issue specified in any of its publicly available documents. The draft Basic Universal Principles document is available in English and French, but has not been widely disseminated to stakeholders.

Participation – external stakeholder engagement
No senior manager is publicly identified as having responsibility for oversight of IOC external stakeholder engagement practices. Nor is any mechanism to ensure compliance with IOC commitments to external stakeholder engagement within IOC governance described in any of its publicly available documents.

Participation - member control
The IOC Session, the annual meeting of all 115 IOC members, elects a President for a term of eight years, with the possibility of a single extension of four years, and Executive Board members for terms of four years. The Executive Board consists of the IOC President, four Vice-Presidents and ten other members. All members are given representation at the governing body level although it is not clear whether individual members are able to add items to the Session agenda or if only the Executive Board or President may do so.

The IOC Charter does not indicate how Executive Board candidates are nominated and placed on the ballot for election by the IOC Session. Based on publicly available information, no process was identified that would allow members to initiate a process of dismissal for members of the Executive Board.

2008 GAR Accountability Profile

For ten decades their practice had been for the executive board to present names to the annual session – and see them co-opted by acclamation. What would the new process be? [After the Olympic Reform Commission] Here it was: the executive board would present names to the annual session – and see them co-opted by acclamation. If anything, the process was more sinister than before. Now there would be a selection committee to 'evaluate the quality of candidates'. Secret reports would be prepared to help the executive board to decide who to recommend to their colleagues. “The principle of of cooptation is a guarantee of independence”, said the reformers on their very first page.

p326, The Great Olympic Swindle, Andrew Jennings and Clare Sambrook, Simon & Schuster, 2000

Complaints and response—internal and external
The IOC has no publicly available policy or procedure for handling internal complaints from employees. However, the IOC does have the Ethics (2007) book which includes the IOC Code of Ethics and an investigative procedure for the IOC Ethics Commission to handle complaints regarding Code of Ethics violations.

There is no clear indication of whether staff may raise a complaint, but the IOC Ethics Commission process appears intended to apply to all members of the Olympic Movement and all Olympic Games participants with an emphasis on IOC members. Nonetheless, Ethics and its contents do not adhere to accepted best practice principles for complaints handling such as commitments to complainant confidentiality, nonretaliation, and independence of the investigative process.

There are no publicly available documents outlining the IOC’s policy and procedures for complaints from external complainants regarding IOC policies or compliance with policies in its activities.

The IOC Ethics Commission is responsible for overseeing and investigating internal complaints regarding violations of the IOC Code of Ethics, but there is no indication of any training given to Commission members. The Ethics book is available in English and French on the IOC website and in hard copy upon request.

“Giving the ethics commission the responsibility to eliminate the perception of IOC misconduct without giving them the power to do so is like finding a man drowning twenty feet from shore, tossing him a fifteen-foot rope, proudly claiming you've met him more than halfway.”

John Naber of Olympic Athletes Together Honorably (OATH) testifying before a US Congressional Commerce Investigations Committee inquiry into the Salt Lake City scandal; p346, The Great Olympic Swindle.

Performance snapshot
The IOC scores poorly in comparison to all sector averages in every dimension of accountability capabilities except participation. This relatively higher score in participation is largely due to the IOC’s incorporation of key external stakeholder groups in its governance.

However, these strong capabilities are offset by its inequitable member control that provides several key powers to the IOC President and Executive Board that are unchecked by the IOC Session. The IOC’s transparency and evaluation capabilities are the least developed both within the INGO sector and when measured against all other assessed organisations;

...... In addition, despite the establishment of the IOC Ethics Commission, the IOC performs poorly in complaints handling capabilities due to the lack of protections provided to complainants. As a result of these accountability gaps the IOC ranks at the very bottom of both the INGO sector and all assessed organisations for 2008.

2008 GAR, Accountability Profile

Global Accountability Report

The story continues: Park Yong-sung restored as an IOC member after corruption scandal

Kipketer calls for fairer procedures in IOC Athletes' Commission

IOC ignores own charter